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AN EX POST FACTO ENIGMA: WHEN DOES
INCREASED INCARCERATION NOT EQUATE
TO INCREASED PUNISHMENT?
Calamiav. Singletary,
686 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1996)*
Richard E. Mitchell*
Petitioner, a Florida prison inmate convicted of murder,' received
"provisional credits"2 under the statute in effect at the time of his
offense.3 In total, petitioner's credits operated to reduce his period of
confinement by 420 days.4 Subsequent to petitioner's offense, the
Florida Legislature amended the provisional credit statute specifically to
preclude convicted murderers from receiving credits.5 Finding the
legislature's mandate clear, the Florida Department of Corrections

* Editor's Note: Prior to publication of this case comment, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the Supreme Court of Florida decision upon which the comment is based. 117 S.
Ct. 1309 (1997). Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed its position on the issue,
and granted the petitioners the requested writs. 694 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 1997). Although the
Supreme Court of Florida decided to reinstate the petitioners' credits, the court did so in an
extremely cursory opinion. It is our hope, therefore, that the legal analysis found in this case
comment will contribute to the molding and articulation of Ex Post Facto Clause jurisprudence
in Florida.
** This case comment is dedicated to my angel, Tracy McGuire, my parents, Robert and
Marjorie Mitchell, and to the many influential friends and mentors I have been blessed to cross
paths with in my life. They are, in order of appearance: Miguel Desdin, Jeff Vahle, Steve Bums,
Chris Billings, Erin Wallace, Dave Barratt, Roger Arnold, Hobel Florido, and Professor Jeff
Davis.
1. Calamia v. Singletary, 686 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1996). Petitioner, Russell Calamia, was
charged with first-degree murder for a homicide committed January 3, 1986. After pleading nolo
contendere to a reduced charge of second-degree murder, petitioner was sentenced to 20 years
in prison, including a three-year minimum mandatory sentence for possession of a firearm. See
id. at 1338.
2. See id. "Provisional credits" are awarded to prisoners when the correctional system
reaches a specified percentage of its lawful capacity in order to alleviate overcrowding. See FLA.
STAT. § 944.277 (Supp. 1992).
3. FLA. STAT. § 944.277 (Supp. 1988). This statute authorized the Secretary of
Corrections to grant up to 60 days of provisional credits to inmates when the inmate population
of the correctional system reached 97.5% of lawful capacity.
4. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338.
5. See FLA. STAT. § 944.277(1)(e) (Supp. 1992).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 7
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

cancelled petitioner's previously awarded credits and corresponding 420day sentence reduction.
In response, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
Supreme Court of Florida,7 arguing that the amendment, as applied to
him, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States and the
Florida Constitutions.' Rejecting petitioner's ex post facto argument, the
Court summarily denied the petition.9 Thereafter, the United States
Supreme Court vacated the denial of the petition,"0 and remanded the
case for further consideration in light of its decision in California
Department of Correctionsv. Morales."
The Supreme Court of Florida determined that Morales supported its
prior decision', and again denied the petition. 2 The Court HELD, that the
amendment, as applied to petitioner, does not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because the provisional credit statute is "procedural in nature,' 13
and therefore not subject to ex post facto prohibitions. 4
Generally, an ex post facto law is "[any] law passed after the
occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which retrospectively
changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or deed."'" The
purposes underlying the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws
are to ensure that all citizens receive fair notice of laws and to prevent

6. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338.
7. Id.
8. See id.; see also U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. I (stating that "[n]o State shall ... pass
any ... ex post facto Law"); FLA. CONST of 1968, art. I, § 10 (stating that "[n]o... ex post
facto law. .. shall be passed"); FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. X, § 9 (forbidding state legislature
from enacting laws that "affect prosecution or punishment" for any offense previously
committed).
9. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338.
10. Id.
11. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
12. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1340-41. In denying the petition, the court refused to
reinstate petitioner's provisional credits, reasoning, in part, that the reinstatement of the cancelled
credits "would provide an unearned and unwarranted windfall to thousands of prisoners." Id. at
1341.
13. See id. at 1339 (quoting Dugger v. Rodrick, 584 So. 2d 2, 4 (Fla. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1037 (1992)). The Rodrick court found that because the provisional credit statute is
procedural in nature, it is not directed toward the traditional purposes of punishment and
therefore not subject to ex post facto prohibitions. See Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 4.
14. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1339 (citing Griffin v. Singletary, 638 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla.
1994)). The Griffin court held that "the ex post facto clauses of both the federal and state
constitutions did not prohibit the legislature from passing, nor the Department of Corrections
from enforcing, legislation that limited or eliminated the availability of [provisional credits]."
Id.
15. Marshall J. Tinkle, Forward into the Past:State Constitutionsand Retroactive Laws,
65 TEMP. L. REv. 1253, 1256 (1992) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 520 (5th ed. 1979)).
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governmental bodies from acting arbitrarily or vindictively towards
certain individuals or groups.16
In 1798, the United States Supreme Court first interpreted the Ex
Post Facto Clause in the landmark case of Calder v. Bull. 7 More
8 the Court interpreted the Ex Post
recently, in Weaver v. Graham,"
Facto Clause as it applied to a factual situation similar to the instant
case. 9 In Weaver, the Court decided whether the retroactive application
of a statutory amendment that decreased the availability of gain time
credits to prisoners violated the Ex Pqst Facto Clause.2" Under the
statute in effect at the time of the petitioner's offense, gain time credits
were awarded to prisoners at an increasing monthly rate that was
directly related to each prisoner's time served.2 Subsequent to the
petitioner's crime, the Florida Legislature amended the statute to reduce
the rate at which prisoners accumulated credits.22 These lower rates
were applied to all prisoners, including the petitioner.23
The petitioner in Weaver sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
Supreme Court of Florida, but was denied relief.24 Reversing, the
Weaver Court explained that a law is ex post facto if it makes the

16. See Neil Colman McCabe & Cynthia Ann Bell, Ex Post Facto Provisions of State
Constitutions, 4 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. & CONsT. L. 133, 133-34 (1991).
17. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). In the Supreme Court's original interpretation of the
United States Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court declared the following four
categories of laws that are ex post facto violations:
Ist. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which
was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that
aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules
of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender.
Id. at 390.
18. 450 U.S. 24 (1980).
19. See id. at 26-27 (noting that the amount of gain time for which the petitioner would
be eligible was decreased).
20. See id. at 25.
21. See id. at 26 (describing the calculation of gain time prescribed by FLA. STAT. §
944.27(1) (1975)).
22. See id. (comparing the original and the amended systems).
23. See id. at 27 (stating that the new provision was implemented on January 1, 1979, but
that the Department of Corrections retroactively applied the new provision to all prisoners whose
crimes occurred prior to the provision's enactment in 1978).
24. See id. at 27-28.
25. See id. at 36. The case was reversed and remanded. See id.
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punishment "more onerous" for a crime committed before its enactment.26 Applying this test to the facts in Weaver, the Court found that
the amendment made petitioner's punishment more onerous by
increasing his effective sentence by approximately two years.27
Further, the Weaver Court stressed that early release opportunities
factor significantly into both plea bargaining decisions and sentence
calculations.28 In this light, the Court found that the gain time credit
statute was a consideration in the petitioner's original punishment.29
Thus, because the amendment made the punishment more onerous for
a crime committed before its enactment, the Court held that the
amendment, as applied to the petitioner, violated the Ex Post Facto
Clause.3"
Almost a decade later, the Court limited the Weaver test in Collins
v. Youngblood.3 In Collins, the Court decided whether the retroactive
application of law to reform an improper jury verdict constituted an ex
post facto violation.32 At the end of a jury trial, respondent was
sentenced to life imprisonment plus a $10,000 fine.33 On appeal, this
verdict was found improper because it imposed a fine in addition to
imprisonment.34 Under the law in effect at the time of his offense,
respondent was entitled to a new trial as a result of the improper

26. See id. (stating that the added burden placed on petitioner violated ex post facto
proscriptions).
27. See id. at 27. Petitioner's tentative release date, as established under FLA. STAT. §
944.27 (1975), was set for December 31, 1984. The State calculated that application of the new
gaintime provision starting with its effective date resulted in a projected release date of February
2, 1987. The increase in petitioner's period of confinement amounted to 14% of his original
15-year sentence. See id. at 27 n.4. Accord Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293-94 (1976)
(holding that a statute did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because it did not change the
"quantum of punishment" attached to a crime).
28. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)).
The Court refused to determine whether the prospect of gain time was part of petitioner's
sentence in a technical sense. Instead, the Court concluded that gain time is in fact one
determinant of petitioner's prison term, and that petitioner's effective sentence was altered once
this determinant was changed. See id.
29. See id. at 32; see also Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397, 401-02 (1937) (finding
that "lilt is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of petitioners to be deprived of all opportunity
to receive a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control prior to the
expiration of [their prison] term").
30. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 36.
31. 497 U.S. 37 (1989).
32. See id. at 39.
33. Id.
34. See id. At the time of respondent's offense, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did
not authorize a jury to impose a fine in addition to a term of imprisonment for respondent's
offense. See id.
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verdict.3" However, while respondent's appeal was pending, the state
legislature enacted a law authorizing the state courts to reform improper
verdicts rather than requiring them to grant new trials. 6 Pursuant to
this law, the trial court denied respondent's request for a new trial, and
instead reformed his sentence by deleting the fine.37 Respondent
asserted that the trial court's reformed verdict constituted an Ex Post
Facto Clause violation, and sought a writ of habeas corpus from the
federal courts system.38 The district court found that no ex post facto
violation had occurred because respondent's punishment was not
increased.39 The court of appeals reversed the district court decision,
and found that retroactive application of the statute to respondent
violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.'
The Collins Court disagreed,4 and explained that a law is ex post
facto if it retroactively alters the definition of a crime or increases the
punishment attached to a crime.4" Applying this test to the facts in
Collins, the Court held that the law did not violate the Ex Post Facto
Clause because it merely altered adjudication procedures in criminal
cases rather than impacting substantive rights.43 The Court stressed,
however, that a law is not shielded from an ex post facto challenge
simply because it carries a "procedural" label."
Recently, the Court applied Collins and Weaver in California
Department of Correctionsv. Morales." In Morales, the Court decided
whether the retroactive application of an amendment authorizing a
decrease in the frequency of a prisoner's parole hearings constituted an
ex post facto violation. 6 Respondent, a California prison inmate twice
convicted of murder,47 was entitled to annual parole hearings under the

35. See id.; see also Bogany v. State, 661 S.W.2d 957 (1983) (ruling that a verdict
imposing a fine in addition to imprisonment was void and entitled the defendant to a new trial).
36. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 40. The new statute specifically was enacted to modify the
decision reached in Bogany, 661 S.W.2d at 957, by allowing the state courts to reform the jury
verdict. See id. at 39-40.
37. Id. at 40.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 52.
42. See id. at 42 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925)).
43. See id. at 45 (promoting the position that a law labeled "procedural" can be ex post
facto if it infringes on substantive rights).
44. See id. at46 (summarizing the Court's discussion of the distinction between procedural
and substantive laws).
45. 514 U.S. 499 (1995).
46. See id.
47. Id.
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statute in effect at the time of his second offense.48 Subsequent to the
respondent's offense, the state legislature passed a statutory amendment
authorizing the state parole board to defer the parole hearings of
multiple murderers for up to three years in order to improve the board's
efficiency.49 Pursuant to this amendment, the parole board deferred
respondent's second parole hearing for three years. 0
Lowering the threshold of unconstitutionality set forth in Weaver and
Collins, the Morales Court stated that a law is ex post facto if it merely
produces a "sufficient risk" of increasing the punishment attached to a
crime committed before its enactment."' Applying this modified test to
the facts in Morales, the Court found that the deferral of the
respondent's hearing failed to produce a sufficient risk of increasing
respondent's punishment. 2 Reasoning that the likelihood of parole for
a multiple murderer was remote, 3 the Court found that, at most, the
deferral created a "highly speculative" and "attenuated risk" of
increasing respondent's punishment.'
The Court further explained that a prisoner's parole release date does
not arrive until several years after the prisoner is found suitable for
parole. In this light, the Court found that respondent's deferral was
not likely to extend his actual period of confinement. 6 Indeed, the
Court stated "that there [was] no reason to think that [the postponed

48. See id. at 503 (describing the parole hearing procedural in effect at the time of
respondent's offense).
49. See id. The amendment expressly required that, before deferring a prisoner's
subsequent parole hearing, the board must find it unreasonable to expect that parole would be
granted at a hearing during the following years, and state the basis for its finding. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3041.5(b)(2) (West 1982). The Court found that the amendment was enacted to
allow the parole board to avoid the futility of going through the motions of reannouncing its
denial of parole suitability on a yearly basis. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 503.
50. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 503.
51. Id. at 509.
52. See id.; see generally Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1976) (refusing to accept
mere speculation that the effective punishment under a new statutory scheme would be "more
onerous" than under the old one).
53. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 511-12. Indeed, while the current action was pending,
respondent appeared before the parole board and was again found unsuitable for parole. After
the board determined that it was not reasonable to expect that respondent would be found
suitable for parole at the following two annual hearings, respondent's next hearing was again
deferred for three years. Id. at 504 n.2.
54. See id. at 514.
55. Id. at 513. The Court reasoned that the possibility of immediate release after a finding
of suitability is largely theoretical. See id. (citing In re Jackson, 703 P.2d 100, 106 (Cal. 1985)).
56. See id. (stating that the release date of a prisoner who proves himself to be suitable
for parole will not be affected by an alteration in the timing of suitability hearings).
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hearing] would extend any prisoner's actual period of confinement." 7
Accordingly, the Court held that the amendment, as applied to the
respondent, did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the
deferral did not produce a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment
attached to respondent's crime."
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the
provisional credit statute is "procedural in nature" because it is an
administrative tool for alleviating prison overcrowding. 9 The court
reiterated its historic position that early-release credits are granted only
as a procedural measure.' Granting the amendment refuge under
Collins as a "procedural" law,6' the court held that the amendment, as
applied to the petitioner, does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause
its procedural nature protects it from ex post facto challengbecause
62
es.
The instant court supported this holding with the following line of
reasoning: Provisional credits are only awarded if a prison becomes
overcrowded. 3 Because prison overcrowding is driven by many outside
variables, there is no guarantee that a prisoner will ever receive
provisional credits.' Because their receipt is purely speculative,
provisional credits bear no relationship to the original or ultimate
punishment attached to petitioner's crime.6 As a result, the cancellation
of petitioner's credits is not an ex post facto violation because the
cancellation does not increase the original or ultimate punishment
attached to petitioner's crime.'
However, the instant court's reasoning ignores several important
facts. First, the prison system did become overcrowded while petitioner

57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 514.
59. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1339 (citing Griffin, 638 So. 2d at 501).
60. See id. (quoting Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 4).
61. See id. at 1340 (quoting Morales, 115 S. Ct. at 1602 n.3).
62. Id. at 1341.
63. See id. at 1338; see also Dugger v. Grant, 610 So. 2d 428, 430 (Fla. 1992) (holding
that administrative gain time statutes were not enacted for the benefit of prisoners; rather, the
statutes were merely part of a procedure utilized by the Department of Corrections to alleviate
prison overcrowding when the lawful capacity of the prison system reaches 97.5%).
64. See Calamia,686 So. 2d at 1339 (quoting Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 4 (reasoning that the
eligibility and receipt by a prisoner of provisional credits for prison overcrowding is in no way
tied to overall length of sentence because such awards are contingent and dependent upon many
outside variables)).
65. See id. (implying that provisional credits are not a quantitative element of a prisoner's
sentence).
66. See id.
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was incarcerated.67 Second, petitioner did receive provisional credits
that reduced his period of confinement by a total of 420 days. 6 Third,
the amendment was enacted after petitioner's offense and was retroactively applied to him. 69 Finally, the cancellation of petitioner's credits
increased his period of confinement by 420 days.70
These facts support the conclusion that the amendment in the instant
case violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. For example, under Weaver, a
law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it makes the punishment "more
onerous" for a crime committed before its enactment.71 A straightforward application of this test shows the amendment's unconstitutionality.72 First, it is undisputed that the amendment was enacted after the
date of petitioner's offense.73 Second, the amendment clearly makes
petitioner's punishment "more onerous" by increasing his period of
confinement, or his "effective sentence," by 420 days.74
The reasoning of the Morales Court strengthens this conclusion.
Under Morales, a law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it produces
a sufficient risk of increasing the punishment attached to a crime
committed before its enactment.75 In applying this test, the Morales
Court stressed that a merely speculative or attenuated risk of increasing
punishment does not render a law unconstitutionally ex post facto.7 6
In the instant case, the risk of increasing petitioner's punishment was
neither speculative or attenuated.77 On the contrary, the risk of increasing petitioner's punishment was unequivocally realized in his 420-day
sentence increase. 7' Because the amendment goes well beyond the

67. See id. at 1338 (reporting that credits had been awarded to petitioner due to
overcrowding).
68. Id.
69. See id. Petitioner's offense occurred on January 3, 1986. The amendment which
authorized the cancellation of petitioner's credits was enacted on January 1, 1990. See id.
70. See id. at 1343 (Harding, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]n plainest terms, the sections
resulted in a recalculation of release dates which lengthened the amount of time affected
prisoners would spend incarcerated").
71. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 33 (stating the idea that a retrospective law can be applied
only if it is not to an affected person's detriment).
72. Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1343 (Harding, J., dissenting) (asserting succinctly that the
revocation of petitioner's credits "constitutes a textbook ex post facto violation").
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 509.
76. See id. at 509, 514. The MoralesCourt stated that "conjectural effects are insufficient
under any threshold" used to evaluate whether a statute violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id.
at 509.
77. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
78. See Calania,686 So. 2d at 1338.
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Morales threshold, its application to the petitioner is an ex post facto
violation.
The amendment also finds no refuge under Collins. Unlike the statute
in Collins, which simply altered adjudication procedures,79 the provisional credit statute directly impacts petitioner's substantive rights."0 As
the Collins Court made clear, the constitution prohibits any law that
increases the punishment attached to a crime committed before the law's
enactment, regardless of its form.81
In the instant case, the amendment impacts petitioner's substantive
rights by increasing the length of time that he will be deprived of his
liberty.82 As emphasized by the Weaver Court, early release opportunities factor significantly into the calculation of how long a person's
liberty will be withheld. Because the amendment directly impacts
petitioner's substantive rights by depriving him of his liberty, Collins
supports the conclusion that the amendment's application violates the Ex
Post Facto Clause even though it takes an arguably procedural form.84
The instant court erred by failing to recognize that "it is the effect,
not the form, of the law that determines whether it is ex post facto."8 5
Shielding the amendment from ex post facto prohibitions by donning it
with "procedural" garb,86 the instant court ignored the plain fact that
the retroactive cancellation of petitioner's credits unequivocally
increased the punishment for a crime committed before its enactment."

79. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 45. The Collins Court distinguished changes in criminal
adjudication procedures from changes that alter the substantive law of a crime. See id.
80. See Calamia,686 So. 2d at 1344 (Harding, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that
"[e]ven though the credits here may be called 'administrative,' they factored into [petitioner's
sentence] exactly as incentive and basic gain-time did." Id. Further, the provisional credit statute
"called for calculation of ...[petitioner's] release date based on the credits [petitioner received],
and established a scheme for the DOC to follow in releasing inmates from incarceration." Id.
81. See Collins, 497 U.S. at 46 (citing Beazell, 269 U.S. at 170).
82. See Calamia,686 So. 2d at 1344. The dissent stated that "[cilearly, provisional credits
affect substantive rights." Id.; see also U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV,§ 2 ("[No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall ...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.").
83. See Weaver, 450 U.S. at 32; see also supra note 28.
84. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1344 (Harding, J., dissenting) (quoting Weaver, 450 U.S.
at 29 n.12).
85. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 31 (rejecting respondent's argument that the statute was not
effectively retroactive because it applied only prospectively).
86. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1339 (quoting Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 4). In Rodrick, the
Court distinguished provisional credits from basic gain time and incentive credits by reasoning
that, unlike the other types of credits, provisional credits are not quantifiable elements of the
length of a prisoner's original sentence. See Rodrick, 584 So. 2d at 4.
87. See Calamia, 686 So. 2d at 1338.
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Fortunately, the logic used by the instant court in reaching its
conclusion recently was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in
Lynce v. Mathis, a case factually similar to the instant case.8 As a
result, in future cases, the Florida court must determine whether a law
is unconstitutionally ex post facto based on its substantive effect rather
than its apparent form.

88. Lynce v. Mathis, 116 S. Ct. 1671 (1996).
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